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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tia Jo Satcher appeals from her judgment of conviction for grand theft.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Danelle Ostolasa-Mendiola went shopping at Walmart on Christmas Eve
at about 11:30 a.m. (Trial Tr., p. 176, L. 8- p. 177, L. 13; p. 178, Ls. 3-19.) After
completing her shopping she put her purse in the shopping cart and went to her
car and unloaded the cart. (Trial Tr., p. 177, L. 14 - p. 180, L. 19.) She did not
have a view of the cart at all times when she unloaded. (Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls. 2025.) Once done unloading she saw that the cart was empty, including not having
her purse in it, and assumed she had put her purse in the car. (Trial Tr., p. 181,
Ls. 1-20.) In fact, she did not have her purse. (Trial Tr., p. 181, L. 21 - p. 182, L.
8.)

At 12:34, shortly after the purse went missing, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's
credit card was used at a Flying J gas station adjacent to the Walmart. (Trial Tr.,
p. 182, L. 13 - p. 185, L. 2; p. 190 Ls. 12-23; p. 210, Ls. 5-10.) Video from the
Flying J shows Satcher in a van, with the male driver of the van buying gas at
that time. (Trial Tr., p. 307, L. 2 - p. 311, L. 22; State's Exhibit 2.)
The police began following Satcher at the Towne Square Mall on an
unrelated matter about one and one-half hours after Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's
credit card had been used at the convenience store. (Trial Tr., p. 221, L. 24 - p.
225, L. 24.) The police followed the van in which Satcher was a passenger as it
went across the street from the mall to the parking lot of the Toys-R-Us and then
1

onto Westpark, south on Milwaukee, east on Franklin, south on Cole, west on
Overland, and into the parking lot of the Walmart. (Trial Tr., p. 225, L. 25 - p.
227, L. 24.) The police made contact with Satcher and the male driver, Robert
Minor, in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p. 228, L. 2 - p. 231, L. 11.) Satcher
was on her cell phone at that time. (Trial Tr., p. 230, L. 25 - p. 231, L. 6.) The
van's gas gauge was full. (Trial Tr., p. 234, Ls. 1-20.)
At around 2:30, about three hours after the purse went missing, Ms.
Ostolasa-Mendiola received a call from Satcher, who stated she had found the
purse in the trash dumpsters at Walmart. (Trial Tr., p. 186, L. 2-p. 187, L 9.)
Satcher, however, said she could not talk at that time because she was being
pulled over by the police. (Trial Tr., p. 187, Ls. 10-13.) After confirming to Ms.
Ostolasa-Mendiola that the purse contained a driver's license and credit cards
Satcher hung up. (Trial Tr., p. 187, L. 14 - p. 188, L. 8.) When the police made
contact with her, Satcher's first statement was that she was returning the purse,
which was the first the police knew about any issue involving a purse. (Trial Tr.,
p. 232, Ls. 3-13.) A couple of minutes after talking with Satcher, Ms. OstolasaMendiola received a call from the police stating that they had her purse. (Trial
Tr., p. 188, Ls. 9-12; p. 192, Ls. 15-24.)
When contacted by a detective at the police station, before being
questioned or confronted with any evidence, Satcher denied having used
Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card.

(Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24.)

During the

interview she stated that she had discovered the purse in a shopping cart at
Walmart between 11 :50 and 12:30. (Trial Tr., p. 302, Ls. 5-13; p. 304, Ls. 7-10.)
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Satcher denied having used the credit card while it was in her possession but did
not deny that her male companion used it, and acknowledged that the credit card
had been used to buy gas for the van at the Flying J. (Trial Tr., p. 304, L. 11 - p.
305, L. 18.)
The state charged Satcher with grand theft of lost property. (R., pp. 3334, 119-20.) The jury returned a guilty verdict.

(R., p. 153.) Satcher filed a

timelynoticeofappealfromthejudgment. (R., pp.157, 161.)

3

ISSUES
Satcher states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there insufficient evidence in this case to support the
State's allegation of grand theft of lost property in the form of
a financial transaction card?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the State, over Ms.
Satcher's objection, to elicit testimony from a police officer
as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher's denial of guilt was
truthful?

3.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he intentionally
elicited testimony from one witness regarding his opinion of
Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying guilt of the charged
offense?

4.

Did the district court err when it admitted evidence in the
form of a restitution order under the auspices of I.R.E. 609
where the restitution order was not a criminal conviction and
was not admitted for any purpose related to Ms. Satcher's
credibility?

5.

Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this
case?

(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

The evidence showed that Satcher had possession of the purse for over
two hours; that a credit card in the purse was used by Satcher's
companion to buy gas; and that Satcher contacted the victim only while
literally in the act of being contacted by the police. Has Satcher failed to
show that a rational jury could not conclude that Satcher did not take
reasonable measures to return the purse and its contents to the owner?

2.

Has Satcher failed to show reversible error in the admission of opinion
testimony about whether Satcher's statements to police were truthful
because any such error was harmless?

3.

Has Satcher failed to show reversible error in the admission of evidence
that she owed restitution jointly with Robert Minor in association with a
prior felony conviction because such error was harmless?

4.

Has Satcher failed to show cumulative error?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Satcher's Claim That The Evidence Is Insufficient To Show That She Did Not
Take Reasonable Measures To Return The Purse And Its Contents To The
Owner Is Meritless
A.

Introduction
Satcher contends the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the

evidence is that she took reasonable measures to return the stolen property and
that she did not withhold the purse or its contents from Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola
with intent to deprive her of her property.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-20.) This

argument is meritless.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn
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from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict Miller,
131 ldahoat292, 955 P.2d at607; Hart, 112 ldahoat761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

C.

Satcher's Argument That The Evidence Is Insufficient Is Frivolous
To prove theft of stolen property the state had to prove that Satcher

intended either to deprive the victim of her property or to appropriate the same to
herself or another. I.C. § 18-2403(1 ). The state also had to prove that Satcher
did not take reasonable measures to return the property to its owner. I.C. § 182403(2)(c). The evidence established that Satcher had Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's
purse and its contents for over two hours; her boyfriend used a credit card from
the purse to buy gas shortly after Satcher acquired possession of the purse; and
Satcher contacted the victim only after the police had followed her vehicle for
about 15 minutes and were in the act of detaining her. The evidence presented
supports the inference that Satcher both intended to deprive Ms. OstolasaMendiola of the purse and its contents and did not take reasonable measures to
return the purse and its contents to its owner.

Indeed, it is hard to draw any

conclusion other than that Satcher and her boyfriend intended to use Ms.
Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit cards and only changed their minds upon being
caught.

Satcher's argument, which relies upon an assumption that the jury

believed her testimony as long as it "was not directly contradicted" and ignores
most of the other evidence (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20), is legally and factually
frivolous.
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11.
Satcher Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Admission Of Opinion
Testimony About Whether Satcher's Statements To Police Were Truthful
Because Any Such Error Was Harmless

A

Introduction
The prosecution asked Detective Kendall if, based on his training and

experience, he believed Satcher had been truthful in his interview of her. (Trial
Tr., p. 320, Ls. 5-7; p. 321, Ls. 15-25.) Satcher objected to the question. (Trial
Tr., p. 320, Ls. 8-11; p. 321, Ls. 1-5; p. 322, Ls. 1-14.) The court ultimately
allowed the prosecution to ask the detective's opinion on Satcher's truthfulness
during the interview, and the detective testified he "did not feel she was being
truthful." (Trial Tr., p. 322, L. 23 - p. 323, L. 15.)
On appeal Satcher asserts that the district court erred in admitting
evidence

of

Detective

Kendall's

(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-26.)
inadmissible.

opinion

as

to

Satcher's

truthfulness. 1

The state concedes that the evidence was

State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 468-69, 163 P.3d 1175,

1180-81 (2007) (opinion testimony on truthfulness of other witnesses is
inadmissible). However, the error was harmless and Satcher's trial was fair.

1

Satcher also argues that it was prosecutorial misconduct to ask the detective his
opinion as to Satcher's truthfulness in the interview. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2931.) The state does not concede any claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Although it is prosecutorial misconduct to ask questions seeking inadmissible
evidence as a way of circumventing either the rules of evidence or judicial
rulings,
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181
(2007) (citing State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903)), here the
district court ruled the evidence admissible. Thus, the state submits, it is judicial
error, not prosecutorial misconduct, at issue here.
7

B.

Standard Of Review For Harmless Error
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a).
See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,
974 (2010).

C.

Admission Of Detective Kendall's Opinion That Satcher Was Not Truthful
In The Interview Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
"[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect

one."

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).

In reviewing for

harmless error the court evaluates the potential prejudice from the inadmissible
evidence in the context of the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Yager,
139 Idaho 680, 687, 85 P.3d 656, 663 (2004) (error in failing to suppress
evidence harmless because probative value of evidence improperly admitted at
trial was de minimus in light of evidence presented). Review of the record shows
that admission of Detective Kendall's opinion that Satcher was untruthful in the
interview did not deny Satcher a fair trial because the potential prejudice of the
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improper opinion testimony was minimal in light of the evidence presented at
trial. Beyond a reasonable doubt a rational jury would have convicted Satcher
even without admission of that evidence.
Evidence of opinion testimony that a witness is not truthful is "an invasion
of the province of the jury, who are the judges of the credibility of witnesses."
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,468, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2007) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).

"Generally, expert testimony that purports to

determine whether a particular witness is truthful on a particular occasion is not
permitted because there is no reason to believe that experts are any more
qualified to render such opinions than are jurors."
omitted).

kl

(quotations and citations

Thus, the potential prejudice here is that the jurors deferred to

Detective Kendall's determination of truthfulness, and thereby reached a
determination on truthfulness they would

not have reached without the

inadmissible opinion testimony, and thus reached a different verdict.
That this potential prejudice did not result in a different verdict than would
have been reached without admission of the evidence is shown by three factors.
First, the jury already knew or would have surmised that Detective Kendall did
not believe Satcher's exculpatory version of events without the challenged
evidence. Second, the jury instructions minimized the potential for prejudice by
minimizing the chance that the jurors simply deferred to Detective Kendall's
opinion instead of forming their own opinions as to the truthfulness of Satcher's
statements in the interview.

Finally, the evidence at trial overwhelmingly

demonstrated that Satcher's statements in the interview were not truthful. These
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three factors, individually and cumulatively, show that the error did not affect the
outcome of the trial.
First, Detective Kendall's testimony that, in his opinion, Satcher was
untruthful in the interview was not information unknown to the jury even without
the inadmissible testimony.

In the interview Satcher provided a generally

exculpatory account of her behavior in relation to the purse, claiming a desire to
get it back to its owner and ignorance that her boyfriend had used the credit card.
(State's Exhibit 1; see also Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24; p. 302, Ls. 5-13; p. 304, L.
7 - p. 306, L. 15; p. 311, L. 23 - p. 312, L. 5.) The fact that Satcher was charged
and the detective was a witness against her would have informed any rational
jury that the detective did not accept her exculpatory version of events as truthful.
(See Trial Tr., p. 325, Ls. 10-14 (detective told Satcher that he would decide
"what course the criminal proceedings would take"); p. 328, Ls. 4-8). They also
heard evidence that Detective Kendall had repeatedly told Satcher in the course
of the interview that he did not believe her. (State's Exhibit 1; Trial Tr., p. 325,
Ls. 2-9; p. 327, Ls. 21-24.)

The evidence at trial clearly established that

Detective Kendall did not believe Satcher's exculpatory version of events; it was
therefore unlikely that the inadmissible testimony in any way persuaded the jury
to reach a conclusion it would not have reached without the testimony.
Second, the jury instructions minimized any potential for prejudice. The
jury was instructed that it was not required to accept all the evidence that was
admitted (Trial Tr., p. 463, Ls. 20-21 ); that it must make its own evaluation of the
evidence and assign it what weight it believed the evidence deserved (Trial Tr.,
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p. 463, Ls. 21-25); that the jurors should consider their own experiences in
evaluating credibility (Trial Tr., p. 464, Ls. 8-15); what factors jurors might
consider in evaluating testimony (Trial Tr., p. 464, L. 16 - p. 465, L. 10); and that
the jurors were not bound by any expert opinions (Trial Tr., p. 465, Ls. 11-17).
The instructions thus made it clear that the jury was not bound by the detective's
opinion, and that it was free to make its own determination of Satcher's
truthfulness.
Finally, the evidence of Satcher's untruthfulness was overwhelming.
Satcher would have had the jury believe that she discovered the purse while
looking for her missing wallet (Trial Tr., p. 408, L. 13 - p. 410, L. 4; p. 433, L. 9 p. 434, L. 18), but once she found the purse she abandoned the search for her
own wallet, went shopping elsewhere for two hours, then returned to Walmart to
resume the search for her wallet (Trial Tr., p. 453, L. 7 - p. 454, L. 11). She
would have the jury believe that she declined to place the purse in the store lost
and found because it was not secured (Trial Tr., p. 410, L. 20- p. 411, L. 12; p.
440, L. 9 - p. 442, L. 18), but then kept it with her or in the van her boyfriend was
using for more than two hours before finally making contact with the victim. She
would have the jurors believe that after confirming that someone was likely
available for a phone call at the purse owner's house (due to a busy signal) (Trial
Tr., p. 411, L. 12 - p. 413, L. 9; p. 443, Ls. 2-8), she did not make another call for
about two hours despite a desire to return the purse (Trial Tr., p. 418, L. 24 - p.
419, L. 13; p. 443, L. 9 - p. 447, L. 20). The call in which she did make contact
with the victim happened to coincide with Satcher being contacted by the police.
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(Trial Tr., p. 420, L. 16- p. 421, L. 3; p. 454, Ls. 12-14.) Finally, she would have
the jury believe that her boyfriend, while the purse was placed on the floor of the
van between the seats he and Satcher were sitting in, got into the purse that was
unfamiliar to him, accessed the wallet that he was, again, unfamiliar with,
removed the credit card that he did not know was there, purchased gas with the
credit card, returned the credit card, and zipped the purse compartment where
the wallet was, all without her knowledge because her dog had strategically
positioned itself to prevent her from seeing any of this. (Trial Tr., p. 182, L. 13 p. 183, L. 18; p. 416, L. 22 - p. 418, L. 5; p. 419, Ls. 15-19; p. 449, L. 9 - p. 452,
L. 3.)

In addition, Satcher's version of events conflicted with other evidence.
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified she had an answering machine that had no
messages on the day in question (Trial Tr., p. 185, L. 20 - p. 186, L. 1), but
Satcher claimed that the victim's phone simply rang without any response when
she first tried to call (Trial Tr., p. 412, Ls. 19-24; p. 445, Ls. 7-10). Ms. OstolasaMendiola testified that Satcher told her she had found the purse in a trash
dumpster at Walmart (Trial Tr., p. 187, Ls. 1-9; p. 190, Ls. 4-6), but Satcher
testified she found the purse in a shopping cart about 75 yards from a recycle bin
at the Flying J. (Trial Tr., p. 430, L. 20 - p. 431, L. 16).

Satcher had been

convicted of two felonies, including one forgery. (Trial Tr., p. 404, L. 17 - p. 405,
L. 2.) In addition, Satcher was quick to tell the police that she was trying to return

the purse before police even knew a purse was missing (Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 3-
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13) and she denied using the credit card at a time when she claimed she did not
know the credit card had been used (Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24).
The record before this Court shows that a rational jury would, beyond a
reasonable doubt, have convicted Satcher even without the admission of the
challenged evidence. Although Detective Kendall's testimony that in his opinion
Satcher was untruthful in the interview was not admissible, there is no basis for
believing that the jury abandoned its role as arbiters of credibility or that the jury
would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the opinion. The error
was harmless.

111.
Satcher Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Admission Of Evidence
That She Owed Restitution Jointly With Robert Minor In Association With Her
Felony Conviction Because Such Error Was Harmless

A.

Introduction
The district court ruled that Satcher could be impeached with evidence

that she had a prior felony forgery conviction in 2004 and a felony conviction in
2009 (but that the nature of the conviction, grand theft, was inadmissible). (Trial
Tr., p. 358, Ls. 19-23; p. 367, Ls. 9-15; p. 373, Ls. 10-21.) The court also ruled,
over objection, that to the extent the defense claimed that Robert Minor operated
alone when he used the victim's credit card, the state could impeach that
evidence with evidence that the restitution order regarding the 2009 felony was
joint and several between Satchel and Minor. (Trial Tr., p. 367, L. 5 - p. 369, L.
13; p. 373, L 10 - p. 374, L. 14.) During direct examination Satcher testified that
she had been convicted of forgery in 2004 and a felony in 2009. (Trial Tr., p.
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404, L. 17 - p. 405, L. 2.) The evidence presented to the jury regarding the
restitution order was, in its entirety, the following two questions and answers:
The matter for which you're on probation in Canyon
County, in 2009, is there an order of restitution in that case?
Q.

A.

Yes there is.

Q.
And does that or - order of restitution include a
person named Robert Minor?

A.

Yes, sir.

(Trial Tr., p. 405, Ls. 3-9.)
Satcher claims that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the
restitution related to the prior felony conviction.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 32-38.)

The state concedes that evidence that there was a restitution order related to a
prior unidentified felony that "include[d] a person named Robert Minor" was
irrelevant. 2 I.RE. 402. The error, however, was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review For Harmless Error
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.RE. 103(a).
See also I.C.R 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho

2

The state's concession is limited to relevance; as set forth more fully below, the
state does not concede that the evidence actually admitted was unfairly
prejudicial.
14

664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,
974 (2010).

C.

Any Error From Admission Of Evidence That The Restitution Order In The
Prior Undesignated Felony Included Robert Minor Was Harmless
Evidence that Satcher's 2009 unspecified felony conviction resulted in a

restitution order that "include[d] a person named Robert Minor," while irrelevant,
was not unfairly prejudicial.

Satchel argues that the evidence was prejudicial

because "the jury would infer the defendant's criminal propensity from that
evidence." (Appellant's brief, p. 35.)

This argument is illogical. Satcher does

not claim that evidence that she was convicted of a felony was inadmissible; that
the felony conviction also resulted in a restitution order does not somehow
unfairly call attention to criminal propensity.
On the face of the record, the jury was very briefly informed that the 2009
conviction for an unspecified felony also resulted in a restitution order that
included Robert Minor.

Satchel has failed to articulate a plausible reason to

believe that this evidence in fact unfairly prejudiced her at trial. Given the weight
and volume of the evidence of her guilt, as set forth in more detail above, this
passing, irrelevant, reference to restitution was harmless error.
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IV.
Satcher Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error

"The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities,
each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show
the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right
to due process." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,965 P.2d 174 (1998) (internal
quotation omitted); see also State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77,
95 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "The presence of errors alone, however, does not require the
reversal of a conviction." State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714,

249 P.3d 1169,

1180 (Ct. App. 2010). "[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair
trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
Although the state's concessions that there were two errors in the trial
makes the cumulative error analysis applicable, review shows that Satcher
received a fair, if imperfect, trial.

First, the two errors would not result in

prejudice that would have cumulative effect. That the jury was informed there
was a restitution order that involved Minor did not bolster Detective Kendall's
opinion that Satchel was untruthful in the interview and vice-versa. Second, as
shown above, in the context of the whole trial, including the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, the inadmissible evidence did not call into question the fairness
of the trial.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.
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